































1. History of EU-Turkey Relations1 
1.1. The Traditional Position: (conditional) support for Turkish EU 
membership  
The NetherlaŶds has traditioŶallǇ supported TurkeǇ͛s EU ŵeŵďership. But that support has 
never been unconditional. As elsewhere inside the EU there have always been doubts about the 
capacity of Turkey to adapt and of the EU to absorb. But the fact remains that the Dutch 
government, which held the presidency of the Council at the time, helped to pave the way for 
the opening of official negotiations in 2004. But of course, strings were attached: the 
Copenhagen Criteria would have to be met aŶd iŶ ĐoŵďiŶatioŶ ǁith the forŵula of the ͞opeŶ-
eŶded proĐess͟ it ǁas Đlear that ŵeŵďership ǁas Ŷot a guaraŶteed outĐoŵe. It ǁas eǆpeĐted to 
be a long process during which Turkey could become a different, more European, country.  
An important internal motive to follow this road was the presence of a large Turkish community 
in The Netherlands. In a way Turkey was already there, one argued. From a broader perspective, 
one of the main arguments for opening up to the country was the advantage of integrating a 
large Muslim country in a region of strategic importance to the EU. It would be an important 
positive signal to the Islamic world. There was a certain optimism that membership talks would 
help Turkey to become a more democratic country. It was hoped that with the new AK party 
government the remnants of the old autocratic regime would be removed – in particular as 
regarded the role of the armed forces – and that relations with the Kurdish minority would be 
improved. But there was also the more mundane fact that the Dutch as president of the EU was 
responsible for finding a compromise between the Members States – many of them not very 
enthusiastic – and the pressure from Ankara that after so many years in the waiting room now – 
after the 2004 EU enlargement – demanded the start of official negotiations. 
1.2. The changed narrative: Euroscepticism and anti-Islam polemics  
But a lot has changed since then. The dominant narrative about Turkey has become much more 
negative. First of all the ͞no͟ to the Constitutional Treaty in the national referendum of 2005 
ǁas iŶterpreted partlǇ as a protest agaiŶst the ͚ďig ďaŶg͛ eŶlargeŵeŶt of the EU iŶ ϮϬϬϰ aŶd 
against the prospective membership of Turkey. Politicians could not ignore this signal, became 
more critical of the enlargement process and began to doubt the wisdom of the official approach 
to Turkey.  
This changing attitude also has to be seen against the background of increasing Euroscepticism 
and a growing anti-Islam mood due to the difficulties with the local integration of Moroccan and 
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 The EU 28 Country Reports were completed before the Turkish Constitutional Referendum on 16 April 2017. 
Thus, the report does not take account of any potential changes in the national debate that might have 
occurred in the meantime. 
  
 








Turkish minorities. This caused tensions that fed an already strong undercurrent in Dutch society 
turning against traditional politics. What was seen by many ordinary citizens as the failure of the 
multicultural society, came to be exploited successfully first by the populist politician Pim 
Fortuijn, who was later murdered, and after him by the former liberal MP Geert Wilders and his 
Party of Freedom (PVV) that presently is again a frontrunner in many Dutch opinion polls. It was 
Ŷo real surprise that iŶ this politiĐal Đliŵate soŵe politiĐal parties totallǇ turŶed agaiŶst TurkeǇ͛s 
membership of the EU; others increasingly questioned the process as such.  
While also the Dutch in general reacted positively to the initial reform process started in Turkey 
after 2004, lately there has been disappointment regarding the attitude of the Turkish 
government and the obvious backsliding towards a more autocratic regime. Although the 
attempted coup of July 2016 was clearly condemned by The Hague, the steps taken afterwards 
by the ErdoğaŶ regime have been labelled as disproportionate, to say the least. There is grave 
concern about the mass arrests, the on-going attacks on the free media, the escalation in South 
Eastern Turkey and the detention of HDP parliamentarians. Also the interference of Turkey in 
the Dutch Turkish community trying to turn it against the Gülen movement, has created bad 
blood. There is a growing distrust about the links between the Turkish government and local 
religious organisations. A number of Dutch Turks has reacted to this growing criticism of the 
present regime in Ankara by turning their backs on the parties they traditionally supported and 
expressing their sympathies for a more or less ethnic party founded by tǁo MP͛s that left the 
Dutch Labour Party. Recently a row erupted between the Dutch and Turkish governments about 
the participation of the Turkish Foreign Minister in an event to be held in Rotterdam to promote 
the ͞yes͟ in the referendum on the Turkish constitution. This was labelled as an unwelcome 
intervention in Dutch society and its Turkish community. The Dutch government in the end 
denied this minister landing rights. Another Turkish minister who came by land from Germany to 
Rotterdam to give a speech there was sent back by the authorities. This started a diplomatic 
conflict that has not been solved yet. The Dutch have been accused by the Turkish government 
of ͞NAZI methods͟ and the Dutch ambassador has not been allowed to return to Turkey after a 
leave. 
1.3. Main Policy concerns 
The main policy areas that are being discussed in The Netherlands as being key to EU-Turkey 
relations are the accession process, the backsliding of democracy and the rule of law, the 
absorption capacity of the EU, the refugee crisis and Syria, the geopolitical context and the 
relations between the Turkish government and the large Turkish community in The Netherlands. 
There is growing scepticism regarding the relevance of the accession negotiations since Turkey is 
seen as heading in the wrong direction after the attempted coup. Would it not be time to look 
for other options? Questions remain regarding the capacity of a troubled EU to integrate a large 
Muslim country such as Turkey. Although the number of Syrian refugees has dropped 
  
 








enormously as a consequence of the EU-Turkey refugee deal, there is still unease about the 
concessions made to the country regarding visa liberalisation and accession talks. While one of 
the main arguments to open the EU door to Turkey was and is the wish to embed it in Europe 
and its rules-based, value-driven approach to the world, Ankara has opted for a somewhat 
different approach, ŵore iŶ liŶe ǁith ‘ussia͛s ǀieǁs of the ǁorld. The disĐussioŶ aďout the dual 
and sometimes conflicting loyalty of Dutch citizens of Turkish origin continues. 
2. Future of EU-Turkey relations 
2.1. Critical of further EU enlargement 
The decision of the European Commission not to further enlarge the EU during its mandate until 
2019 was welcomed in The Hague. Some political parties even want a complete end of the 
process; others agree to delay its implementation. No one wants to add new names to the list of 
candidate countries. The fear that this would be the case for Ukraine moved many in The 
Netherlands to vote against the association treaty with Ukraine in the recent referendum. The 
Dutch government has demanded a public confirmation from the EU that association is not a 
step in the direction of EU membership as a condition for final ratification of the agreement. 
Since the plebiscite was of a consultative character, the ͞no͟ is not legally binding which gives 
the government room for interpretation – in this case signing after some concessions of the EU 
and Ukraine. The European Council of December 2016 agreed to a text which confirms that the 
Association Treaty cannot be interpreted as a step towards EU membership and does not 
contain military obligations. These were some of the main issues during the referendum 
campaign. The Dutch Second Chamber of Parliament approved this solution. Confirmation by the 
Senate is expected. The fact that the ͞no͟ of the referendum was interpreted this way hardly 
had any effect on the outcome of the 15th of March national elections. Although Croatia͛s 
accession was not actually contested, future ratifications will most likely be put to a referendum. 
When analysing the current debate on Turkey in The Netherlands, one can observe a few main 
trends. One is a value-based approach criticising Turkey for its undemocratic behaviour but not 
giving up completely the perspective of EU membership. Proponents of this policy usually 
underline the importance of Turkey as a partner and the (economic) interests of the EU in the 
region. Some parties argue that Turkey is just too big to integrate in the EU. Its accession would 
complicate EU decision-making and it could have a very detrimental effect on employment 
conditions – the free movement of labour could cause a huge influx of Turkish workers accepting 
very low wages. There is also resistance against integrating such a large Muslim country. On 
religious grounds, but even more given the popularity of the anti-Islam party of Geert Wilders 
out of fear of loss of national identity. Wilders has taken a very tough line on Turkey labelling 
President Recep Tayyip ErdoğaŶ as aŶ ͚islaŵofasĐist͛.   
  
 








The official Dutch appreciation of the November 2016 European Commission report on the 
negotiations with Turkey was critical. In a letter to the Parliament the Foreign Minister 
reiterated that The Netherlands cannot accept that internal political divisions in Turkey are being 
exported to his country where they create tensions in Turkish communities. He warned more or 
less that the introduction of the death penalty in Turkey is a red line not to be crossed. On the 
sensitive topic of visa liberalisation, the minister underlined again that all the benchmarks would 
have to be fully met by Turkey. 
Although the offiĐial positioŶ still does Ŷot eǆĐlude TurkeǇ͛s ŵeŵďership of the EU, the politiĐal 
elite as a whole remains rather sceptical and the population, if given the choice in a national 
referendum, would certainly vote against it. The party platforms for the 2017 national elections 
are not very promising from a Turkish perspective. They range from leaving the EU altogether 
(Turkey problem solved), no Turkish membership at all, officially halting the negotiations to 
membership not now and only under very strict conditions. In the most recent State of the 
European Union published by the Dutch government in December 2016, enlargement is not an 
issue at all. Turkey is only mentioned in the part devoted to migration. The report states that we 
need Turkey to tackle that problem and the terrorist threat but that the country is a partner that 
has very different views about core rule of law issues.  
While some parties want to halt the accession talks anyhow, others hope to use the negotiations 
the push the Turkish government in a different direction and at least want to protect the 
channels needed to cooperate with Ankara on the refugee issue and other regional challenges. 
But nobody expects a turnaround of President ErdoğaŶ. The debate about the links to Turkey 
thus mainly finds place in the context of the EU. The fact that the country is full member of 
NATO hardly plays any role. 
2.2. Alternative options for Turkey 
There will be national elections in The Netherlands on the 15
th
 of March 2017. One should not 
be surprised that their outcome will lead to a political constellation in which a different 
government would put the end of accession negotiations high on the agenda. This would of 
course also bring about a debate on alternatives such as a privileged partnership. The Dutch 
might be keen to further develop this concept since it could also be used for other EU 
neighbouring countries such as Ukraine for which accession seems definitively blocked after the 
͞no͟ to the association treaty in the recent Dutch referendum. This would mean exchanging the 
option of integration for intense cooperation. Since the interest in Turkish integration is waning 
and EU accession disappearing beyond the immediate time horizon, expanding the customs 
union is seen as a short-term alternative to maintain some positive dynamics in the cooperation 
with Turkey.   
  
 








2.3. Disappointment with the political change  
Under pressure from the national public debate and the Dutch parliament, the Foreign Minister 
has lately tried to convince his EU colleagues to block certain EU funds out of protest against 
anti-democratic steps of the Turkish government and also proposed to temporarily freeze the 
accession negotiations. He found insufficient support for that in the Council of Ministers because 
a majority of EU countries do not want to further complicate relations with Turkey right now 
also with the EU-Turkey refugee deal and the situation concerning Syria in mind. They were only 
willing to put a sentence in the conclusions of the December 2016 General Affairs Council saying 
that in fact no new negotiating chapters had been opened since the 30
th
 of June and that there 
were no plans to do so under the present circumstances. This weaker formula was however 
blocked by Austria that demanded a more radical decision - the formal halt of the membership 
talks with Turkey. As a consequence there were no formal Council conclusions on the 
Commission enlargement package – only a Slovak presidency statement. 
The agreement on refugees, although heavily promoted by the Dutch governing coalition, was 
met with some scepticism by the opposition in the Dutch Second Chamber of Parliament.  There 
was major criticism of the promises made to Turkey regarding visa liberalisation and the 
intensification of the accession negotiations. Nevertheless, The Netherlands has a huge interest 
in the successful outcome of the deal since the now stopped influx of Syrian war refugees 
created a lot of practical and political problems in 2015. This is one of the reasons why the Dutch 
will certainly not go so far as demand a complete break in the accession process. 
3. EU-Turkey Relations and the Neighbourhood/Global scene 
3.1. No to the association treaty with Ukraine 
The outcome of the 2016 Ukraine referendum – no to the association treaty – certainly limits the 
Dutch ambitions regarding the EU͛s Ŷeighďourhood, both the East and South. The Dutch attitude 
towards these countries, including Turkey, will remain to be determined more by immediate 
concerns regarding human rights violations, Islam and identity, the refugee threat and the 
protection of labour markets rather than long-term strategic considerations.  
The debate about possible disadvantageous geopolitical shifts in the immediate neighbourhood, 
including Turkey, does not have much impact. Relations with these countries are seen through 
domestic glasses with an emphasis on short-term interests and immediate threats. Geopolitical 
arguments about the role of Russia in the periphery did not impress the majority of Dutch voters 
who said ͞no͟ against the association treaty with Ukraine. They were led by the possible 
negative consequences for The Netherlands of an eventual Ukrainian membership and not to be 












3.2. Maintaining and promoting stability in the common neighbourhood 
Even though relations between the EU in general, and The Netherlands in particular, and Turkey 
have deteriorated with also Ankara setting a negative tone, the two sides have an interest in 
maintaining and promoting stability in the common neighbourhood. This includes the Black Sea 
area but more importantly parts of the MENA region. If relations were to improve, further action 
to tackle the causes of unwanted migration and Jihadism could be envisaged in these areas.  
Energy security and economic development are also areas of potential cooperation. 
3.3. The global level: Russia and Syria  
For the moment, the rapprochement between Moscow and Ankara is not used as an argument 
to be friendlier towards Turkey. There is an awareness of the danger posed by an eventual 
triangular coalition of Trump, Putin and ErdoğaŶ, but how to react to that remains an open 
question. 
The civil war in Syria and its consequences have certainly had an impact on the Dutch view of 
Turkey. The Netherlands support the anti-Assad coalition and there is and was sympathy for the 
Turkish efforts in providing support to millions of Syrian refugees. There is great relief that the 
flow of war victims to Europe has been halted due to the deal with Ankara. 
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